The roots of the Lega Nord’s populist regionalism by Newth, George
        
Citation for published version:
Newth, G 2019, 'The roots of the Lega Nord’s populist regionalism', Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 384-
406. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2019.1615784
DOI:
10.1080/0031322X.2019.1615784
Publication date:
2019
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
his is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Patterns of Prejudice on 26th July
2019, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0031322X.2019.1615784
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 29. Jul. 2020
1 
 
Patterns of Prejudice, Manuscript Resubmission 
Title Page 
 
The roots of the Lega Nord’s populist regionalism 
Author:  
George Newth (MA)  
PhD Candidate 
 
Affiliation: 
Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies 
University of Bath 
1 West North 
Claverton Down 
Bath 
BA2 7AY 
United Kingdom 
 
Tel:  
07414951927 
 
Email:  
georgehenrynewth@mail.com 
 
 
Twitter Handle: 
@georgenewth 
 
 
Disclosure statement: 
There is no potential conflict of interest in this article. 
 
 
Notes on contributor: 
George Newth is a PhD Candidate at University of Bath and holds an MA in Contemporary Italian 
Culture and History from UCL. His doctoral research reconceptualizes the roots of the Lega Nord in 
the light of 1950s’ regionalist movements in Lombardy and Piedmont. He has previously published A 
brief comparative history of economic regionalism in the North Italian macro-region and Catalonia 
(Rivista Progressus - Università di Siena. 2014), The Movimento Autonomista Bergamasco and the 
Lega Nord (Modern Italy. 2018) and also collaborates with ‘The Conversation’ and ‘Novara Media’. 
Word Count: 
7892 
2 
The roots of the Lega Nord’s populist regionalism 
 
ABSTRACT   This paper contributes to a greater understanding of the connection 
between regionalism and radical right ideology by examining the roots of the Italian Lega 
Nord’s regionalist, populist and nativist discourse with a new framework of ‘Populist 
Regionalism’. By analysing the discourse of two waves of regionalist activism in Lombardy 
and Piedmont, represented respectively by Movements for Regional Autonomy (MRAs) and 
the Lega Nord (Northern League), the paper underlines a significant connection between 
populist regionalism and the radical right represented by the process of othering used against 
both internal and external migrants. At the same time, examination of narratives used by these 
two waves of activism reveals differences – at times nuanced, at times more explicit – between 
their respective populist and nativist identities.  
 
KEYWORDS        Regionalism, Populism, Nativism, Lega Nord, Radical Right, Padania, First 
Italian Republic, Second Italian Republic, Immigration. 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper contributes to a greater understanding of the connection between 
regionalism and radical right ideology by examining the roots of the Italian Lega Nord’s 
(Lega’s) regionalist, populist and nativist discourse. This study considers the Lega’s process 
of ‘othering’ as part of a longer history of North Italian regionalism with roots in the 1950s,  
While most studies take the starting point of the Lega as the late 1970s or early 1980s, 
this research, instead, builds upon previous work on this party in which it was argued that it 
was the protagonist of a second wave of a North Italian regionalist activism.1  The paper 
introduces a new framework of ‘Populist Regionalism’ which enables a cross-analysis of two 
Movements for Regional Autonomy (MRAs), il Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale 
Piemontese (the MARP) and il Movimento Autonomista Bergamasco (the MAB) and the Lega.  
                                                 
Many thanks to Aurelien Mondon for his invaluable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article, 
particularly regarding the theoretical section and the concluding paragraphs. I also wish to thank Anna Cento 
Bull for her meticulous and insightful feedback on the section of my PhD research on which this article is based.  
1 George Newth, ‘The Movimento Autonomista Bergamasco and the Lega Nord: continuities and 
discontinuities’, Modern Italy, vol.23, no.3, 2018, 235-253.  
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This allows for an examination of how the MRAs influenced the Lega’s ideology.  
While the paper establishes important connections between the exclusionary discourse of the 
two waves of activism, it also identifies important differences between the populist regionalism 
due to two inter-linked factors.  First, while the MRAs were a product of the First Italian 
Republic and operated within its parameters, the Lega was a benefactor of and contributed to 
its downfall and, thus, contributed to the emergence of the Second Italian Republic. Second, 
due to this differing context, each wave of activism belonged to a different wave of populism. 
The populism represented by both the MRAs and the Lega formed part of trends which went 
beyond the Italian case; however, the rise of the Lega can be linked to a much more significant 
rise of European and global populism in the 1980s and 1990s.  
This paper employs a methodology of comparative analysis of the content and tone of 
the materials released by both the MARP and the MAB and also the leagues from both 
Lombardy and Piedmont. Further to existing literature on the Lega, the sources cited in this 
article range from primary material obtained from archival research in Turin, Milan and 
Bergamo, secondary sources written by protagonists of both waves of activism.  
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section establishes a populist 
regionalist framework which forms the basis of discourse analysis. The second section traces 
a brief history of the MRAs and the Lega in the context of two waves of populism. The main 
part of the paper in the third section analyses in some detail three aspects of continuity and 
discontinuity between the two waves of Populist Regionalism. The final section draws 
conclusions by reflecting on how narratives of social exclusion evolved from 1950s’ populist 
regionalism.  
 
Populist Regionalism  
 
In this paper, it is argued that the key elements of populist regionalism are regionalism, 
populism and nativism.  
In the Italian general election of March 2018, Matteo Salvini’s Lega received the 
highest number of votes since its formation in 1991 and subsequently formed a government 
with the Five Star Movement.2 Populism and nativism were present in Salvini’s successful 
electoral campaign, as seen in his promise to ‘return sovereignty to “the people” from the 
                                                 
2 The Post Internazionale, ‘Risultati elezioni 2018: chi ha vinto’  TPI News, 6 June 2018, available at 
www.tpi.it/2018/03/07/risultati-elezioni-politiche-2018-chi-ha-vinto, (viewed 12 June 2018). 
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“poteri forti” (powers that be) in Brussels’, and slogan of ‘Italians first.’3 Regionalism, 
however, was abandoned by Salvini in favour of fighting for Italian sovereignty.  
In removing the iconic words ‘Nord’ and ‘Padania’ (the latter of which had since 1995 
represented the Lega’s imaginary northern state) from his party’s symbols in 2017, Salvini 
ended the second of two waves of North Italian regionalist activism.4 To a certain extent, 
Salvini’s decision represents a logical step in the wake of previous attempts to transform the 
Lega into a national party. These include the attempted establishment of the ‘Lega Centro’ and 
the ‘Lega Sud’ to complement the Lega Nord in the early 1990s and the brief rebranding of the 
party as the ‘Lega Nord - Italia Federale’ in the mid-1990s.5  Further to this, the Lega in the 
2000s also ‘stressed the need for a common Christian identity’ and ‘extending this identity to 
all Italians’ portrayed itself as protector of what it argued were traditional Catholic Italian 
values in the face of foreign migration.6 However, up until 2017,  the Lega was able to ‘turn 
on and off its claims for an independent Padania in line with political context’.7 This is evident 
from articles in the Lega’s mouthpiece, La Padania, which in the months leading up to Bossi’s 
resignation suggest a revival of a separatist strategy. Salvini himself also initially rededicated 
the movement to Padanian independence to consolidate support from grassroots members 
before adopting a stance in favour of defending Italian national sovereignty.8 Therefore, 
whereas the Lega had always maintained the possibility to revert back to secessionism, 
Salvini’s rebranding of the Lega represents a much more radical and decisive move.  
While this paper does not systematically engage with Salvini’s rebranded ‘post-
regionalist’ Lega due to this disappearance of the common denominator of regionalism, 
Salvini’s populism and nativism have significant roots in the two waves of regionalist activism 
which preceded him.  
                                                 
3 Matteo Salvini, ‘Popolo contro poteri forti, così riparte l’Italia’, YouTube, available at  
www.youtube.com/watch?v=-HJWvO8mlTo  
(viewed 12 June 2018). 
Valentina Avon, ‘Salvini, nei manifesti lo slogan “Prima gli Italiani.” Ma nelle foto ci sono cechi e slovacchi’, 
La Repubblica.it. 21 February 2018, available at 
http://www.repubblica.it/speciali/politica/elezioni2018/2018/02/21/news/salvini_nei_manifesti_lo_slogan_prim
a_gli_italiani_ma_nelle_foto_ci_sono_cechi_e_slovacchi-189407595/  (viewed 12 June 2018). 
4 Fabio Poletti, ‘Salvini cancella il Nord e la Padania dal simbolo’, La Stampa, 22nd December 2017. 
5 Damian Tambini, Nationalism in Italian politics: The stories of the Northern League 1980-2000, (London: 
Routledge Advances in European Politics 2001), 57-58. 
6 Eva Garau, ‘National Identity and Immigration: The Case of Italy’, PhD Thesis, University of Bath, 2010, 180-
181. 
7 John Foot, The Archipelago, Italy since 1945 (London, Bloomsbury, 2018), 390. 
8 Stefania Piazzo, ‘Padania Indipendente. Bossi suona la carica’, La Padania, 11 January 2012. 
Matteo Salvini, ‘Lega: Salvini, non ci fermiamo fino all’indipendenza’ 15 December. available at 
http://www.leganord.org/notizie2/11657-lega-salvininon-ci-fermiano-fino-all-indipendenza, (viewed 19 May 
2018).  
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My Populist Regionalist framework extends and challenges frameworks constructed by 
Albertazzi and McDonnell on ‘regionalist populism’ and by Mudde on the ‘Populist Radical 
Right.’9 Albertazzi and McDonnell, correctly argue that ‘it is impossible to understand and 
explain the Lega from its foundation to the present day without explicitly highlighting the 
party’s regionalist character’, following Biorcio’s definition of the Lega as ‘Regionalist 
Populist’.10 The Lega offered a ‘blend of regionalism and populism’ using ‘a framework of 
interpretation in which a positively evaluated us or the people – honest, hard-working and 
simple-living northern Italians attached to their local traditions -  are juxtaposed against poteri 
forti, or powers that be’.11  However, while the term Regionalist Populism suggests that 
populism is a core ideology, I argue that the best term to use in order to compare two regionalist 
movements across two different time periods is Populist Regionalism. In this choice of 
semantics, I adopt and adapt Mudde’s preference for the term Populist Radical Right rather 
than Radical Right Populist due to the fact that ‘in Radical Right Populism, the primary term 
is populism, while “radical right” functions merely to describe the ideological emphasis of this 
specific form of populism. Populist Radical Right, on the other hand, refers to a populist form 
of the radical right.’12  
I contend, therefore, that whereas the primary term in Regionalist Populism is 
populism, Populist Regionalism refers to a populist form of regionalism. This, therefore, is 
more in line with the theory of populism as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ inasmuch as it ‘does not 
so much overlap with as diffuse itself throughout full ideologies’ such as, in this case, 
regionalism.13   
Mudde, who identified Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties as primarily, ‘nativist, 
authoritarian and populist’, categorized the Lega as a ‘borderline’ example of this group, due 
to the fact that ‘while populism has always been a core feature of the Lega…authoritarianism 
                                                 
9 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007). 
Duncan McDonnell ‘A weekend in Padania: Regionalist Populism and the Lega Nord’, Politics, vol.26, no.2, 
2006, 126-132 (127). 
Daniele Albertazzi, ‘Addressing the people: A comparative study of the Lega Nord’s and Lega dei Ticinesi’s 
Political Rhetoric and Styles of Propaganda’, Modern Italy, vol.12, no.3, 2007, 327-347 (331-332). 
10 Roberto Biorcio, ‘La Lega come attore politico: Dal Federalismo al Populismo Regionalista,’ in Renato 
Mannheimer (ed.), La Lega Lombarda, (Milan: Feltrinelli 1991) 34-82. 
Roberto Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, (Milan: Il Saggiatore 1997). 
11 McDonnell, ‘A weekend in Padania: Regionalist Populism and the Lega Nord’, 127. (author’s italics) 
Albertazzi, ‘Addressing the people: A comparative study of the Lega Nord’s and Lega dei Ticinesi’s Political 
Rhetoric and Styles of Propaganda’, 331-332. 
12 Mudde Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 27. 
13 Ibid., 57. 
Ben Stanley ‘The thin ideology of populism’, Journal of Political ideologies, vol.13, no.1, 2008, 95-110 (107). 
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and nativism have not.’14 I argue, instead, that both the Lega’s populism and nativism, 
represent a significant continuity with the political message of the MRAs. The remainder of 
this section defines the different components of populist regionalism. 
Regionalism, refers to ‘bottom up’ political demands from a regional group. 15  It 
denotes ‘the aspirations and activism of the concerned inhabitants of a region, and can be 
applied to the pursuit of the specific interests of such a unit’.16  In this paper regionalism is 
recognised as a core ideology, to which the ‘thin-centred’ ideology of populism is attached. 
Therefore, the key feature of populism in this paper is a view of society as separated 
into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’17 
Populists conflate all parties and politicians as a ‘political class’ or ‘elite’ that feigns opposition 
to distract the people from the fact that they ‘are essentially all the same and working together’; 
populism claims, therefore, to be above the traditional left-right political divide. 18  While, the 
people’ as a concept ‘is simply too broad to tell us anything substantial about the real nature of 
populist constituency’,19 the notion of a ‘single territory of the imagination’ which Taggart 
calls the ‘heartland’ proves more useful.20 When the heartland ‘demands a single populace’ 
and emphasizes ‘the unity and the homogeneity of the imaginary residents’, this results in 
nativism.21   
Nativism is ‘a combination of nationalism and xenophobia’ and, thus, ‘an ideology 
which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the 
nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the 
homogenous nation-state.’22  
Nativism can also be the result of a combination of regionalism and xenophobia, if the 
region is viewed in exclusionary terms and involves a process of ‘othering’ which ‘relies on an 
‘us-them’ distinction’. 23  Different nativist parties ‘target different ‘enemies’ on the basis of a 
broad variety of motivations and prejudices’ ranging ‘from the mobilization of socioeconomic 
                                                 
14 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 57. 
15 Michael Keating, ‘The Political Economy of Regionalism’, in Michael Keating and John Loughlin (eds), The 
Political Economy of Regionalism, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 17-40 (18).  
16 Peter Wagstaff ‘Regions, Nations, States’. In Peter Wagstaff (ed) Regionalism in the European Union, 
(Exeter: Intellect, 1999), 4-18 (6). 
17 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 23. 
18 Cas Mudde, ‘Introduction to the Populist Radical Right’, in Cas Mudde (ed.), The populist Radical Right: A 
reader, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 22-35 (26). 
19 Paul Taggart, Populism, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 98. 
20 Ibid., p.96. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 22. 
23Ibid., p.63. 
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anxieties to the appeal to racial prejudices. 24 The native ‘in-group’ is defined against a clearly 
and explicitly described ‘anti-figure’ or ‘out-group’. 25  
 While ‘nativism does not reduce parties to mere single-issue parties, such as the term 
anti-immigrant does’, anti-immigration can certainly play a central role in nativist discourse in 
terms of ‘othering’.26 When the non-native is defined as ‘the enemy within the state but outside 
the nation’, in Western Europe, this group has been most commonly represented by ‘the 
immigrant community’.27 Nativism is not only relevant for migrant ‘foreigners’…but also 
towards minoritized fellow citizens who may be recast as virtual or de factor ‘foreigners’ – 
indeed ‘enemies’ within the space of the nation state.’28 A case in point ‘is the so-called 
‘southerners’, who can be both immigrants and indigenous ethnic minorities’ 29 Indeed, 
‘various populist radical right parties identity ‘southerners’ as a key enemy within the state, 
but outside the nation.30 Nativism promises ‘to give power back to the people.’31 Not only 
should the native people be the nation’s exclusive inhabitants, but their ‘state should be ruled 
by (people of) their nation’.32 Indeed, ‘the tendency for populists to be explicit in excluding 
certain groups as not part of the real ‘people’ finds a strong echo in the conception of the 
heartland’.33  A common slogan of ‘our own state for our own nation’, for example, ‘Italy for 
the Italians’ is central to an idea of the heartland. 34 
In terms of Populist Regionalism, therefore, regionalism acts as ‘the specific ideology 
behind targeting an ‘elite’ and calling upon a ‘people’ thus defining their ‘essence and 
orientation.’35  Populist regionalists focus on how a political elite or regime is conspiring 
against the region to deprive it of its sovereignty; regionalism is ‘fused with an anti-regime 
discourse to defend the region against the political class’ or a set of others.36 Populist 
                                                 
24 Mudde, ‘Introduction to the Populist Radical Right’, 26. 
Hans-Georg Betz, ‘Nativism across space and time’, Swiss Political Science Review, vol.23, no.4, 2017. 335-
353, (347). 
25 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 64. 
26 Mudde, ‘Introduction to the Populist Radical Right’, 18-22. 
27 Ibid., 70. 
28 Nicholas De Genova, ‘The “native’s point of view” in the anthropology of migration’, Anthropological 
Theory, vol.16, no.2-3, 2016, 227-240 (p.228). 
29Mudde, ‘Introduction to the Populist Radical Right’, 73. 
30Ibid., 73. 
31 Koen Abts and Stijn Van Kessell, ‘Populism’, in James.D.Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the 
Social and Behaviorual Sciences (second edition) (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2015), 609-612 (609). 
32 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 139. 
33 Taggart, Populism, 96. 
34 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 139. 
35 Giorgios Katsambekis, ‘The Populist Surge in post-democratic times: Theoretical and political challenges’, 
The Political Quarterly, vol.88, no.2, 2017, 202-210 (205). 
36 Andrej Zaslove, The Re-invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism and the Italian 
Lega Nord. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011), 88. 
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regionalists also act as the ‘vox populi’ and appeal to ‘the people’ in socio-economic term, 
depicting their regions as  ‘islands of prosperity that can be protected only by a radical type of 
ethnic 'populist' democracy, in which the principle of 'liberal productionism' is pitted against 
that of 'political democracy.’37 Populist Regionalism involves, therefore, a juxtaposition of the 
‘hard-working nature’ of the ‘natives’ of one part of the country with the ‘parasitic and lazy’ 
other half often represented by immigrants or ‘southerners’.  
Populist regionalists depict the hard-working and virtuous region as exploited by the 
political elites which in turn are giving preference to an internal or external ‘other’ and put 
forward their respective regionalist programmes as the best way to return popular sovereignty 
to the heartland. The notion of taking back control of the heartland is not only for the economic 
benefit of its citizens but also the construction of this heartland against a series of dangerous 
‘others’ or ‘non-natives’. Populist Regionalism, therefore, pits the region against a corrupt elite 
whilst also portraying the region as ‘ethnic’, thus raising ‘impenetrable cultural barriers even 
against those who are willing to integrate into the national polity, because it links the concept 
of participatory citizenship to cultural roots’.38   
Populist regionalists claim to protect the ‘homogenous identity and culture’ of the 
region which is ‘threatened by a series of ‘others’.39 Thus, populist regionalism, with its nativist 
element, is not antithetical to radical-right ideology.  
Indeed, Populist Regionalism builds on the theory of ‘nativist nationalism’ which 
according to Zaslove ‘provides the link’ between anti-southernism and anti-immigration.’40  
Further to nativist nationalism, populist regionalism draws Spektorowski’s study of the New 
Right which was ‘an intellectual proto-fascist movement in France … which shifted from … 
nationalism to ethno-regionalism’ and was used as ‘an ideological tool for redefining the 
parameters of inclusion to the community’.41 The New Right viewed ethno-regionalism as 
conducive to an exclusionary ideology due to the fact that the movement’s ideology envisioned 
a particular type of Europe of macro-regions which 
sets an alternative productivist ideology against bourgeois individualism and 
liberal globalization [and] promotes ethnic diversity within a federation of 
                                                 
37 Alberto Spektorowski, ‘Ethnoregionalism: The intellectual new right and the Lega Nord’, The Global Review 
of Ethnopolitics, vol.2, no.3-4, 2003, 55-70 (63). 
38 Ibid., 58. 
39 McDonnell ‘A weekend in Padania: Regionalist Populism and the Lega Nord’, 128. 
40 Zaslove, The Reinvention of the European Radical right: Populism, Regionalism and the Lega Nord, p.108. 
41 Spektorowski, ‘Ethnoregionalism: The intellectual new right and the Lega Nord’, pp.56-57.  
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European ethnicities, banned to non-Europeans and to those considered to be 
non-productive Europeans.42 
Finally, the framework used in this article draws on Albertazzi’s and McDonnell’s definition 
of populism as ‘a “thin-centred” ideology which pits a homogeneous people against a set of 
elites and dangerous others depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign 
people of their rights, values, prosperity and voice.’43  
However, the analysis in this article will demonstrate that, unlike the aforementioned 
frameworks, Populist Regionalism, with its components of regionalism, populism and 
nativism, allows for a more nuanced analysis of where regionalism and right-wing nativism 
overlap. It therefore, allows for a greater understanding of Radical Right parties with 
regionalist roots by taking into account the nativist discourse of its populist regionalist 
precursors. Indeed, the benefit of seeing populism as a thin-centred ideology is that this 
‘ideational’ approach allows for an examination of ‘populist forces across space and time’.44 
Prior to an analysis of the discourse of the populist forces in this paper, it is first necessary to 
establish a historical context. 
 
Two waves of activism 
 
Both the MRAs’ and the Lega’s regionalism and populism were influenced by their 
specific contexts. While space does not permit a comprehensive analysis of the changing Italian 
political economic and social backdrop between the 1950s and the 1990s/2000s, the following 
paragraphs act as a point of reference for the comparison between the respective discourses of 
the MRAs and the Lega in the case study which follows.  This serves to reinforce my aim not 
only to highlight the similarities but also the differences between these movements’ political 
messages. 
The MRAs formed part of a 1950s wave of populism as ‘a product of the post-1945 period 
and the transition between Fascism and the Republic (later to be known as the ‘First Republic’)’ 
campaigning at a local level on a platform of lower taxes, anti-politics, anti-southernism and 
anti-centralism; all elements which would later be adapted by the Lega.45   
                                                 
42 Ibid., p.61.  
43Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, Populists in Power, (London and New York: Routledge, 2015),5. 
44 Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘Populism’ in Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargeant and 
Marc Stears (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 493-
511 (493). 
45 Newth, ‘The Movimento Autonomista Begrmasco and the Lega Nord’, 6. 
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The MARP and the MAB were in many ways similar to other 1950s’ populist movements 
such as  l’Uomo Qualunque of Italy and Poujadisme of France, in their claims ‘to incarnate the 
revolt of the small against the big’ and espouse ‘the cause of the small man, attacking big 
capital and the self-serving politicians who promoted it.’46 Like Qualunquismo and 
Poujadisme, the MRAs positioned themselves against the entire political class,  claiming to be 
‘neither on the  right, nor on the left, nor on the centre’ and instead appealing ‘to the honest 
people…regardless of social condition, ideological conviction or political affiliation.’47   
What differentiated the MRAs from other 1950s’ populist movements, however, was their 
regionalist activism and nativist discourse connected to post-war migration.  The MRAs fielded 
candidates in municipal elections in 1956 to campaign for the activation of regional statutes, 
which although having been written into the Republican constitution of 1948, had remained 
inactive.48  The region was presented as a way to stem migration from the South in the post-
war period. Piedmont was the ‘prime receiving region’ of the ‘more than 2 million people 
[who] left Italy’s south … in the two decades following WW2’.49  However, southern Italians 
also migrated towards Lombardy and its provinces, such as Bergamo.50  After electing 
councillors to communal and provincial councils, an attempt was made in 1958 to forge an 
alliance of regionalist movements called the MARPadania. However, the overall aim remained 
that of achieving regional autonomy sanctioned by the constitution and this alliance did not to 
lead to any notion of a united Northern or Padanian identity like that promoted by the Lega.51 
While the MRAs challenged the parties of the Republic and opposed inter-regional migration,  
they also advocated for national unity and their regionalist message did not share the anti-
nation-state message central to the ideology of leghismo’ which was connected instead to 1990s 
populism. 52 
While the Lega’s populism railed ‘against the political class and the administrative 
bureaucracy and their control over fiscal policy,’ this was tied in with a ‘reaction  against the 
                                                 
46 Aurelien Mondon, The Deep Roots of the Populist Reaction in Parliamentary Democracies: The French and 
Australian Cases as Perspectives, PhD Thesis, La Trobe University, Melbourne, 2011, 109-111. 
James.G.Shields, The Extreme Right in France: From Petain to Le Pen, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 70. 
47 Shields, The Extreme Right in France: From Petain to Le Pen, 80. 
48‘Statute of Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese’, 25 July 1955, Archivio di Stato Torino, 
Category.A3A. Folder: Movimento per l’Autonomia Regionale Piemontese Vol.2. 
 Anselmo Freddi, ‘Il nostro programma’, in Gruppo Autonomista Bergamaschi (eds) Così Parlano gli 
autonomisti, (Bergamo: Gruppo Autonomisti Bergamaschi, 1955) 8-9 (8). 
49 Enrica Capusotti ‘Nordisti contro Sudisti Internal Migration and Racism in Turin, Europe: 1950s and 1960s,  
Italian Culture, vol. 28, no. 2, 121-138 (124-125). 
50 Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 1943-1988, (London: Penguin 1990), 223-226. 
51 ‘Il MARP diventa Padano per presentarsi alle elezioni’, La Stampa, 24 February 1958.  
52 Newth, ‘The Movimento Autonomista Bergamasco and the Lega Nord’, 6. 
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development of a heavily bureaucratized welfare state.’53 The initial leagues - later to be 
aggregated into by Umberto Bossi in 1991 as the ‘Lega Nord’ - emerged in areas of north east 
(Veneto and Lombardy) and north west (Piedmont) Italy, whose economy was based 
predominantly on small, family owned businesses’.54 They demanded‘neo-liberal and 
autonomist’ policies to reduce fiscal pressure and reform a bureaucratized welfare state in the 
face of burgeoning state deficit.55 
Lega populism was later influenced by the fall of the Berlin Wall and ‘the collapse of many 
of the prevailing …Cold War meta-narratives.56  In Italy, the end of the Cold War, the 
Tangentopoli corruption scandals in 1992 and subsequent electoral reform in 1993, constituted 
‘a real electoral earthquake’, in that ‘all the old parties were either wiped out or emerged as 
much weakened’.57 Leghismo ‘amplified the crisis’ by exploiting a 1990s’ populist discourse 
of perceived ‘corruption and collusion in established political parties’ using terms such as 
mafia to describe the political class and emphasise an alleged criminality of politicians.58 
In the face of a second wave of migration from abroad ‘at the beginning of the 1980s’ when 
‘a significant number of non-European and east European immigrants’ reached Italy’s shores, 
the Lega claimed that ‘Italy was being transformed into a multicultural society against the will 
of its citizens by mass immigration from the Maghreb countries and (after 1989) Albania.’ 
Regionalism was, therefore, presented as guaranteeing Northern borders against migration.59  
By the time leghismo emerged, the regional statutes for which the MRAs had campaigned 
had been active for nearly a decade and the Lega’s regionalism aimed to fragment the state and 
weaken the Italian unity which its precursors had defended. Between 1992 and 1995, Bossi 
proposed the division of the peninsula into three ‘macro-regions.’60 
Spektorowski has argued that by promoting these macro-regions, the Lega and the New 
Right were ‘different, but complementary faces of  …  sophisticated right-wing ethno-
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regionalist ideology’.61 However, in its early stages, in contrast to New Right arguments, ‘the 
EU and globalization were allies’ of the Lega Nord and Bossi believed ‘that the Northeast as a 
region was already competing successfully in the global economy. 62 Unlike the New Right, 
Bossi used ethno-regionalism in the Lega’s early stage to principally ‘attack partyocracy, 
consociationalism and state welfarism’ in order to challenge the ‘country’s prevalent form of 
state’ and ‘impose novel (unquestionably North-centric) solutions and policies’.63   
 The Lega’s subsequent secessionist Padania project between 1995 and 1999 saw the 
questioning of Italy as a nation and an attempt ‘to construct (and invent) a’ Padanian 
‘geography and a history’.64  The nationalist and nativist discourse adopted in this period was 
not in line with New Right ethno-regionalism as the key objective of the Lega became the 
protection not of a region but a ‘nation’, ‘the preservation of Padanian culture and identity from 
the powerful global forces arrayed against it – Fortress Padania’.65  
From 1999 secessionism was abandoned and the Lega’s regionalist proposals fluctuated 
between devolution and federalism. Nevertheless, Padania remained part of the Lega’s identity 
and was a key factor in the Lega’s shift to becoming a member of the Radical Right “family” 
of political parties. 66 
 
Case Study  
 
Having established a populist regionalist framework and the necessary historical context, the 
following case study examines in three parts the continuities and discontinuities of populist 
regionalism between MRAs and the Lega, focusing in particular on narratives of exclusion. 
 
Northern ‘islands of prosperity’, corrupt political elites and southern invasion. 
 
Both the MRAs and the Lega accused the perceived elites in Rome of exploiting 
productive ‘islands of prosperity’ in order to favour southerners. However, the Lega also 
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radicalized these nativist claims in line with its 1990s populism in an attempt to counter what 
it portrayed as the south’s hegemony over the Italian state.   
In 1956, the MARP used a populist slogan of ‘Torinesi! This may be your only chance 
to vote exclusively for our poor, mistreated, exploited Piedmont. We’ve had enough of 
politicians and bureaucrats!’67  The MAB also stoked a populist discourse by stating that ‘the 
first observation that one makes of the Italian parties is the similarity between them…instead 
of channeling opinions…they become instruments of propaganda.’68 Leghismo echoed this 
message claiming that ‘the ideologies of the centre, the left and the right’ were ‘unable to 
represent, the people’s demands.’69  Both waves of activism claimed the political elites in Rome 
were conspriring against the region. A major factor in this was a fiscal protest based around 
the Cassa per il Mezzorgiorno (Fund for the South) set up  
 
in 1950 to assist the economic regeneration of the poorest regions of the country,[and] 
spent more than 1,000 billion lire during the first years of its existence on roads, 
electricity, housing, water supplies and other infrastructure works in the south, and over 
8,000 billion lire between 1957 and 1975 on (for the most part failed) schemes to 
promote industrialization. 70 
 
The Cassa, according to the MRAs, was a symbol of the South’s passivity and ‘of the 
North’s generosity’71 The 1950s’ autonomists stated, ‘we pay every year 280 million to the 
state and receive less than 90 million…we are tired of maintaining funds intended for the 
South’ and ‘Lombardy sends 440 million per year to the state and receives no more than 140 
million in return…We cannot industrialize the South at the cost of draining completely the 
resources of the North.’72  The Lega built upon these narratives in the 1990s, claiming that the 
state was ‘responsible for an iniquitous fiscal policy that was harmful to the ‘productive North’ 
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and advantageous to the ‘parasitic’ south’ and that ‘the generous distribution of wealth has not 
brought any real advantage to the South, because only work can truly create wealth.73   
  Migratory flows from South to North in the 1950s exacerbated anti-southernism. The 
MAB argued that taxation was ‘made much worse’ by ‘the continuous influx of immigrants, 
that weighs heavily on our communal administration’.74 The MARP also argued that Piedmont 
was the ‘region which pays the largest quantity than any other in terms of taxes and [had a] 
continued influx…of southern elements and of other regions (around 3,000 per month).’75 
The MRAs pursued a process of ‘othering’ towards southern Italians, as an ‘immigrant 
community’ within the state but outside the region.76 The MARP’s claim for the need of ‘a new 
administration capable of making Turin great again and giving Piedmont back to the 
Piedmontese!’.77 The MAB’s slogan of ‘Lombardy for the Lombards!’’ were later imitated by 
the Leagues with slogans from the Lega Lombarda such as ‘I am Lombard, I vote Lombard’ 
and from Piemont Autonomista of ‘Piedmont for the Piedmontese.’78 Such slogans were 
indicative of these movements’ nativism. 
The MRAs defined northerners against ‘terroni’ (a pejorative term for southern Italians). 
The MARP’s electoral slogan from 1956, promising to ‘Kick Naples out of Turin’ (‘Fuori 
Napoli da Torino’) was cited as ‘one of the main reasons’ for its ‘electoral success among the 
local middle classes’ in Piedmont.79 The MARP also stated that ‘unfortunately…over 200,000 
individuals have come from the South and have invaded every corner of the city’.80 The MAB’s 
electoral campaign in 1956 also presented migration as an invasion and a ‘struggle for 
independence from Sicilians, Calabrese, Pugliese and Neapolitans’.81   
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The MARP argued that ‘it is the duty of citizens to ask first for our children to be 
housed…and say no to invasion.’82 Similarly, the MAB questioned ‘is it really right for us 
Bergamascans, born in a productive and industrial region to see the best jobs systematically 
taken away from us ?’83  Early Lega programmes also included the demand that housing and 
jobs should be reserved for Lombards and the Piedmontese  echoing the MARP’s campaign 
against migration from the South, lamenting that Turin was ‘the third southern city in Italy’.84  
Piedmontese leghisti argued that the ‘biblical style exodus’ from South to the North in the 
1950s and 1960s threatened Piedmontese customs and identity.85 and that ‘the South is stealing 
our jobs’.86     
Strongly linked to the protection of housing and jobs was a perceived colonization of 
bureaucratic posts in the North. In 1956 municipal elections, the ‘MAB became more identified 
with the expression of the discontent for the continued arrival of southern bureaucrats’ and 
argued that ‘local administrative offices should be run by a Lombard or Bergamascan.’87  There 
were also claims that ‘in Bergamo in these past ten years there has been no Bergamascan 
judge…all of them have been terroni ... the same can be said for numerous other key jobs.’88  
The Lega continued this discourse, claiming that ‘Rome has transformed the North into 
a colony with excessive southern population.’89 This perceived ‘degradation of Lombardy into 
a land of conquest’ meant northerners were ‘forced to put up with the choices of a political 
class in Italy…of a largely southern origin.’90 Both Moioli and Cento Bull have observed that 
‘hostility towards the ‘terrone’ as a public functionary’ formed a key part of the Lega’s anti-
southern and ‘one of the main components of the Northern League’s anti-southern attitude is 
‘the transfer of southern employees to public-service jobs in the North’.91 
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Language was important in the MRAs nativist message. The MAB argued that ‘sending 
elementary teachers from the South to our mountain valleys is counter-productive…differences 
in needs, in customs and habits and way of life constitute an insurmountable barrier to academic 
life.’92 There were also claims that ‘many fathers have protested… that [their children] do not 
understand anything of what the “terrone” teacher tells them.’93  In 1980s Lombardy and 
Piedmont ‘the autonomist leagues valued the specificity of regional dialect.’94 The Lega 
Lombarda, in a manifesto entitled ‘Scuola coloniale basta!’ argued that ‘in our schools, we 
must speak our own language’ and that  ‘our teachers must not remain unemployed to allow 
the employment of “others.’’’95  
This section has built upon Cento Bull’s work on ethnicity and racism present in North 
Italian regionalism and the Lega by examining how ‘the diffused quasi racist attitudes of … 
Northern Italians…found political expression and representation….in the 1950s and 1960s’ 
through the MRAs largely due to the fact that ‘immigration from the South to the North 
…created tensions and ill-feelings among the “indigenous” population’.96 
However, while the Lega was able to make a breakthrough in national elections using 
this anti-southern discourse, the MRAs remained on the periphery. This can be explained 
through examining the context of ‘the fiscal crisis of the state and the corruption crisis 
enveloping the political class in the early 1990s which ‘provided the favourable terrain for the 
emergence of counter-hegemonic populist movements and parties’97  
The Lega’s anti-southernism was more radically counter-hegemonic than that of the 
MRAs in that the Lega portrayed the state as having been colonised by the South. In particular, 
the south was viewed as ‘a metaphor summing up all that is wrong with Italian society and 
politics’.98  The Lega was able to offer a radically counter-hegemonic solution to the perceived 
southernization of the entire state.99  
  The MRAs had never suggested as Bossi did that ‘the entire state apparatus had been 
southernized and has perpetuated a system based on favouritism’ through ‘a strategic 
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infiltration’ of southerners into ‘political posts and posts of public order.’100 Indeed, the Lega 
‘attempted to forge a connection between the importation of the mafia to the North and the 
predominance of the southerners in public administration’ 101 By focusing not only on the 
wasteful centralism of Rome, but also the image of a Mafia state, the Lega not only recycled 
MRA discourse but also adapted it to meet the 1990s’ populist emphasis on corruption and 
criminality and a reaction against the heavily bureaucratized welfare state. 102  The Lega argued 
that criminality and mafiosità had become the principle raison d’être of the Italian state. In this 
sense, the Lega’s populist regionalism differed from that of the MRAs as it represented ‘a 
popular struggle by excluded and subordinated groups against the dominant bloc’ of the 
southernized state which was ‘aimed at shifting the balance of power within the dominant 
bloc.’103 
 
From Fortress North to Fortress Padania  
 
The Lega’s secessionist strategy had two significant effects on populist regionalism and 
nativism. First, it led to the definition of an exclusionary heartland outside the borders of the 
Italian state. Second, it played a key role in the Lega’s shift to the right, thus also marking a 
discontinuity with the MRAs which did not have an explicitly far-right identity. The creation 
of Padania meant that rather than excluding ‘others’ (both southern and foreign) from a region 
within the nation-state, Padania became the nation-state and thus the heartland in itself. To 
understand the significance of this, it should be noted that prior to secessionism, differences 
between the MRAs’ and the Lega’s vision of the heartland had been far more nuanced.    
The MRAs’ regionalist discourse emphasized that ‘Italy will be united only when more 
ample and wide-ranging autonomies are granted to each region’, thus not meaning to exclude 
them from the Italian heartland.104 The MRAs argued that ‘the contrast between North and 
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South will remain, until the government, politicians and public officials stop convincing 
themselves that Italy can be governed from the North and the South with the same laws’.105  
In a letter addressed to all southern migrants to Turin, the MARP in an attempt to 
distance himself from accusations of anti-southernism, in his address to southern migrants, 
stated, ‘don’t think that we don’t want you as part of Italy!’.106  Similarly, the MAB encouraged 
greater ‘fraternity between North and South’ by arguing that ‘reflecting…upon the divisions 
between North and South…encouraged greater solidarity and balance in the nation’.107   
  The Lega’s nativism, in its federalist phase, also did not exclude southerners from the 
Italian nation per se; the aim of the  three macro-regions was individual management of three 
economies.108 Bossi’s call for southerners to ‘find answers for themselves via self-government’ 
can, thus, be seen as an echo of the MRAs’ exclusionary vision of a northern heartland, but 
within the framework of the Italian state.109 Until the declaration of Padania, there had been a 
certain level of continuity of the MRAs and the Lega’s message of each region taking care of 
its own interests, whilst not explicitly excluding southerners from Italy.110  
However, the creation of Padania led to a radicalization of this exclusionary heartland 
as, as it emphasized, ‘the impossibility of keeping together, without coercion, a multi-ethnic 
state…in which Southerners represent the ‘foreign’ component: a state whose multiethnic 
character is determined by the presence of fellow Italians classified as non-Padani.’111 
The definition of fellow Italians as ‘non-Padani’ (non-Padanians) marks a discontinuity 
with the nativism of the MRAs. The Lega was not just arguing for the separation of two 
economic systems, but was demanding a separate state split on ‘ethno-cultural lines’. Bossi 
argued that ‘Padania’s citizens are becoming ever more conscious of their identity’ and that  
‘the break-up of the State is inevitable, and it is necessary, as soon as possible, to abandon any 
of the mild regionalist reforms and prepare with urgency, the institutions of a new Padanian 
nation.’112  
A Padanian heartland meant the construction of new borders to stop the invasion of 
Others. The Lega’s shift to becoming a party of the far-right, depended largely on its prior 
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racism and xenophobia towards both internal migration and foreign migration. Indeed, Garau 
has noted that ‘Southerners seem to have now been replaced by non-Italian immigrants in this 
rhetoric against a pluralistic state’, therefore, no longer constituting ‘the main concern of the 
Lega Nord today’.113   
Racism and xenophobia against southerners were key ingredients of a nativism which 
had found political expression in the 1950s’ MRAs. However, the shift from MRA nativism to 
Lega racism can be explained in how the latter wave of activism portrayed Padania as a way 
of defending against a multi-cultural society.  While the MRAs wanted southerners to ‘become 
more Italian’, no such nation-building project was afforded to foreign migration by the Lega 
which has instead ‘actively participated in the creation of an exclusionary Italian identity’ 
against migration from abroad. 114   
An analysis of Lega discourse against foreign migration in the late 1980s and 1990s 
reveals how the focus of the Other was moving towards migration from abroad even before the 
invention of Padania, while also holding key parallels with the MRAs’ nativist discourse.  Just 
as MARP had highlighted cultural differences between Northerners and Southerners, a threat 
to Piedmontese culture and the overcrowding of the city, Piemont Autonomista stated in the 
1980s that ‘we live in fear of this army of illegal immigrants of colour, with their colonising, 
rampant, invasion, irreconcilable with our customs and life.’115 Arguments that ‘jobs and 
houses should be reserved for those who belong to the country’  and that ‘if the “guests” do not 
adapt to our civilization…send them back to where they came from’, had also been used by the 
MRAs.116 
The MRAs, referring to northerners and southerners living in the same region, had 
previously argued that ‘however hard they try, the government, will never be able to 
amalgamate men of such different races’ claiming that ‘whoever is from the North is always 
able to recognise a southerner at first glance, and vice versa.’117 Southerners were referred to 
as ‘foreigners’, and their migration to the North portrayed as a ‘genocide’ of native north 
Italians.118  
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While the claim to protect Italian, European and Christian values was never used by the 
MRAs in arguments against an invasion from the South, such articles echoed MRA discourse 
in attributing blame to the elites in Rome for allowing migration to take place representing a 
continuity in terms of nativist discourse. This was also evident in the Lega’s conflation of 
Islamic Front extremists from Algeria in the 1990s, with the Islamic religion, thus portraying 
extremists such as the Islamic Front as the true face of Islam.119  The Lega repeated this 
accusation in a number of articles against foreign migrants in their publications, Lombardia 
Autonomista and La Padania.120  
While the racism which formed a key element of the Lega Nord’s shift to the right, 
therefore had its roots in MRA nativist discourse, the vital point is that the MRAs had never 
spoken of the need to prevent a ‘multi-racial society’, something which was instead central to 
the Lega’s populist regionalism.  While anti-immigration and nativism has been a constant 
presence in both MRAs and Lega discourse, Padania intensified this discourse and linked it to 
the party’s shift to becoming a party of the radical right, leading to the Lega’s emphasis on 
immigrants from abroad.121 The Lega’s idea of a populist heartland, unlike the MRAs, was 
linked to a new post-Cold War divide that pitted identity against multiculturalism122 and, 
therefore, related to the notion of transforming ‘liberal democracy into an ethnocratic 
regime’.123  Indeed,  ‘with the invention of Padania….the presence of immigrants was 
perceived…as carrying an inner cultural and ethnic difference absolutely incompatible with 
Northerners values.’124  
The Lega used Padania, to give ‘supremacy to the interests of ‘the people’, defined in terms of 
a narrow conception of citizenship” and campaigned against ‘racial and ethnic minorities who 
will not ‘assimilate’ into the desired culture’. 125   
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Stopping the invasion? 
 
How did each wave of activism propose stopping the invasion of non-natives into the 
heartland?  And how was a populist regionalist discourse framed to present stopping an 
invasion as beneficial for the non-natives as well as the native population?  
Both MRAs argued that southerners should be taught to help themselves in their own 
regions, adopting a slogan of ‘aiutare si’, mantenere no’ (let us help them, but not through 
handouts). With regards to the gap between the North and the South in economic terms, MAB 
posed the question of ‘what is the purpose of the Cassa del Mezzogiorno if it doesn’t manage 
to employ southerners in their regions and they continue to come to the North?’126 Southerners 
were, therefore, encouraged to work to strengthen their own region: ‘you can only solve your 
own problems by staying in your own homes and fighting to obtain the right to administer 
yourselves, we will gladly help you as equals, without making you rely on handouts.’127  
The MRAs countered accusations of anti-southernism stating that ‘we are often accused of 
being anti-southern… simply because we want the full activation of the regions… we hope that 
in every other part of Italy, everybody else is working for their own region.’128 
This demonstrates a significant continuity between the MRAs’ and the Lega’s nativism. 
The Lega argued that a separate state of Padania would be of great benefit not just to the North 
but also the South as it would teach it fiscal responsibility.129 After the abandonment of 
secessionism, the Lega continued to adapt the MRAs ‘aiutare sì mantenere no’ to become one 
of their ‘immutable principles’ of ‘aiutiamoli ad aiutarsi’ (let us help them help themselves) or 
‘aiutiamoli a casa loro’ (let us help them in their own homes) to apply to foreign migrants.130  
Indeed Bossi’s claims that ‘a Senegalese is better off tending to his affairs in Senegal than in 
Brescia’ provides a significant parallel with the MRAs’ insistence that each Italian should work 
to improve their own region.131   
While there are definite cross-overs in how stopping the invasion was framed by both 
waves of populist regionalism, an analysis of how the MRAs and the Lega proposed to limit 
migration also reveals discontinuities. The MRAs claimed - falsely – that the regional statutes 
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in the Constitution would provide a solution to ‘uncontrolled migration’ to their regions.  The 
MAB stated that  ‘defending the natural right of residence, for which nobody should have to 
be forced, if not for extreme and just motives, to abandon their place of birth’ was strongly 
linked to ‘the realisation of regional autonomy…as is allowed by article 117 of the 
Constitiution.132 The MAB also argued that ‘when regional autonomy is activated…it will no 
longer be seen necessary to emigrate to other regions’.133 The MARP echoed this idea of 
regional autonomy sanctioned by the constitution placing limits on migration arguing that 
‘regional government was indispensable for all the Italian regions, in ensuring a limit to 
migration from region to region’.134 Suggestions were made to implement a fascist law of 1939 
which had prohibited Italians from ‘transferring their residency to a major centre unless they 
already had a job there’.135 The MARP argued that  
 
the application of the 1939 law is not in contradiction with article 16 of the new 
constitution [it] could be applied effectively to prevent the movement of those 
who not having secured themselves a stable job and inevitably end up shoring 
up the ranks of delinquents, thieves, prostitutes and individuals dedicated to the 
criminal world.136  
 
The final words in this statement show how the MRAs linked immigration and crime 
to give added urgency to the need to stop the invasion. Another MARP exponent stated ‘some 
of the more weak and desperate of you, will maybe commit a criminal offence … disturbing 
the order of the city.’137.  The MRAs did, however, recognize that limited migration was also 
an economic necessity and stated ‘when a city is vital for the nation…it would not be wise to 
impose unnecessary limits on the workforce’.138   
In contrast, the Lega, in its role in right-wing governing coalitions in the Second Italian 
Republic, amended immigration law to adapt it to the challenges that foreign migration posed 
to its heartland. The Bossi-Fini legislation of 2002 and the Security Package of 2009 allow 
significant comparison with MRA proposals. In terms of the Bossi-Fini legislation, the Lega 
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argued that prevous legislation on foreign migration – the ‘Martelli law’ (1989) and ‘Turco-
Napolitano law’ (1998) - ‘gave too many rights to immigrants ... were too lenient on illegals, 
and they did not link employment with immigration.’139 Therefore, the Bossi-Fini law 
‘articulated itself in opposition to the previous laws in its attempt to create an even more rigid 
legal structure to contain immigration’.140 This law essentially ‘linked employment with the 
ability to obtain a work permit or a visa’ making it only possible to obtain ‘a work permit if the 
applicant secures a job, a place of residence, and if the employer can guarantee return passage 
once the new arrival is not employed’. 141 The immigrant would be ‘expected to find a new job, 
or return home when the work permit expired.’142 It should be noted that the Bossi-Fini law in 
purely legislative terms restates what already was established with the first law on foreign 
workers, from 4th December 1963, which the Ufficio Provinciale di Lavoro drafted on the basis 
of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) guidelines on foreign workers.143 However, the 
language adopted by the centre-right coalition’s bill represented a profound change, 
maintaining ‘the public focus on the repressive an authoritarian aura of the legislation’ such as 
proposals ‘for the use of naval force against boats carrying immigrants’ and for ‘the collection 
of biometric data when immigrants applied for or renewed resident permits’.144  
Regarding the ‘security package’ of 2009, this was part of the Lega ‘championing a 
barrage of hard-line measures on immigration’.145  Proposed by Roberto Maroni, a leading 
exponent of the Lega Nord, as Interior Minister in 2008 ‘and introduced in August 2009 as 
Law 94/ 2009… ‘the security package’ was designed explicitly to criminalize clandestine 
immigration, raise barriers to entry and facilitate the expulsion of illegal immigrants.’146 
Having established the measures laid out by each wave of activism, it is possible to note 
both continuities and discontinuities between the MRAs’ and the Lega’s attempts to stop the 
invasion. The Lega’s proposals that work permits depended on obtaining a job can be seen as 
being preceded by the policy recommended by MARP.  The suggestion of the former fascist 
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law working alongside the constitution would, in essence, also criminalise migration as  
proposed by the security package in 2009. Additional continuities are evident by the fact that, 
just as the MRAs had recognised that migration was necessary, ‘while the Lega has opposed 
immigration…at the same time the industrialists of the party’s north-eastern heartland have 
campaigned for larger visa quotas and more immigrant labour.’147  
Significant discontinuity, however, can be seen in the Lega’s emphasis on a European 
invasion as the Bossi-Fini law and the security package ‘catered to the artificial perception of 
a European invasion perpetrated by both documented and undocumented migrants’148 
Additionally, while the MRAs claimed that regional autonomy would tackled the causes of 
migration in that migration would no longer be necessary, on the contrary, the Bossi-Fini law 
‘refused to confront the global phenomenon of migration and the causes which motivate it’. 149 
This is due to the fact that the Lega claimed  ‘migration ought to be temporary as it concerns 
the Italian economic present and not the Italian cultural future’. 150 Instead, the MRAs, did 
indeed concern themselves with both Italy’s economic and cultural future, arguing that Italy 
would be further benefitted by southerners working to improve their own region.  
 
Populist regionalism: Understanding the connection between regionalism and radical 
right ideology.  
 
By sustaining the theory of populism as a thin-centred ideology, and through comparative 
analysis of both primary and secondary sources, this paper has identified how two waves of 
regionalist activism contributed to a process of social exclusion in Lombardy and Piedmont. In 
doing so the paper has demonstrated the historical connection between populist regionalism 
and the radical right as many of the arguments used by the MRAs in the 1950s were 
reformulated and used against migrants from abroad from the 1980s onwards in the Lega’s 
journey to becoming a radical right party.  
In portraying the perceived political elites in Rome as conspiring with the south to threaten 
the homogeneity and prosperity of the Northern community the MRAs provided a populist 
nativist framework which would later be exploited by the Lega.  However, the Lega, by 
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claiming that the entire state had been southernized, could present anti-southernism as part of 
a radical counter-hegemonic project.   
While Populist Regionalism in the 1950s, helped raise ‘impenetrable cultural barriers’ by 
‘linking the concept of participatory citizenship to cultural roots’, Padania, with its new 
exclusive borders separate from the nation-state focused on new threats posed by a multi-
cultural and multi-racial society. 151 Indeed, the Lega’s legislation in the 2000s to stop the 
invasion of the heartland reflected a very different view to national and popular sovereignty to 
that of the MRAs.  
The MRAs, to an extent, acted as precursors in their calls to limit the migration of ‘foreign’ 
southerners; however, their faith in the constitution to limit migration reflects a clear 
discontinuity with the Lega. For the MRAs, the constitutional statutes would help restore 
sovereignty to both North and South. If each region agreed to work towards the greater unity 
of Italy, there would be a permanent place for northerners and southerners in the Italian state. 
By contrast, as the Populist Regionalism of the Lega shifted increasingly to the right, there was 
no permanent place for foreign migrants within either a Padanian or Italian heartland.  
My article, by identifying the MRAs and the Lega as connected by populist regionalism 
up to 1995, does something which cannot be done when viewing the Lega through the lens of 
New Right, nativist nationalism or indeed regionalist populism. Namely, it acts as an essential 
framework in understanding the links and cross-overs between a populist and nativist form of 
regionalism and a populist and nativist form of the radical right between two different periods 
of time. This framework avoids viewing populism as a core ideology takes into consideration 
how the populist and nativist arguments used against southern Italians in the 1950s by the 
MRAs were later adopted and adapted by the Lega, thus enabling a more nuanced analysis of 
the connections between two waves of regionalist activism. 
In terms of future developments of the Lega, a thorough examination of how and to what 
extent Matteo Salvini’s Lega has drawn upon repertoires of exclusionary discourse developed 
by the preceding two waves of populist regionalism has been beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, my article has opened up avenues for such research on this most recent incarnation 
of the Lega to further develop an understanding of the continuing evolution of exclusionary 
regionalist ideology to radical right ideology. 
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